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This paper explores the dynamic properties of price-based policies in a model of competition
betweentwojurisdictions. Jurisdictionsinvestovertimeininfrastructuretoincreasethequalityof
the environment, a global public good. They are identical in all respects but one: initial stocks of
infrastructure. This is a dynamic type of heterogeneity that disappears in the long run. Therefore,
at the steady state, usual intuitions from static settings apply: identical jurisdictions inefﬁciently
under-invest, calling for public subsidies. In the short run, however, counterintuitive properties
are established: i) the evolution of capital stocks can be non-monotonic, ii) one jurisdiction can be
temporarily taxed, even though it should increase its investment, whereas the other is subsidized.
It is shown how these phenomena are related to initial conditions and the kind of interactions
between infrastructure capitals, complementarity or substitutability.
1 Introduction
In recent years the theoretical analysis of price-based policies for the control of environmental
externalities under imperfect competition has received a renewed attention. Previously, most of
the literature focused on the design of optimal tax or subsidy policies in a static setting where
several instantaneous effects of these instruments should be balanced; e.g., with respect to taxa-
tion, the gain in terms of social welfare arising from the reduction of pollution emissions against
the loss from output restriction.
However, little is known about how intertemporal externalities affect the design and the dy-
namic properties of price-based policies. Introducing the time dimension opens the possibility to
raise the critical issue of credibility of public policies, namely how regulations should be framed
to ensure that they remain optimal in their ability to achieve or increase social efﬁciency as cir-
cumstances change over time. Such an explicit consideration of credibility requirements may
qualify substantially the intuitions about price-based regulations gained in a static setting and
provide interesting and sometimes counter-intuitive policy advices.
An important contribution to this literature is Benchekroun and Van Long (1998). They con-
sider efﬁciency inducing taxation1 for the regulation of an oligopolistic industry which is respon-
sible for releasing a stock pollutant – one for which pollution accumulation generates present
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and Georges Zaccour for helpful comments. Also, we thank participants at the 15th annual conference of the EAERE and
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1On efﬁciency inducing taxation, see also Bergstrom et al. (1981), Karp and Livernois (1992) and Karp and Livernois
(1994).
1as well as long-term environmental damages. They formulate a differential game of pollution
control in which the environmental regulator imposes a taxation rule in a symmetric oligopolistic
industry. In this game, the state variable is the pollution stock, the tax policy is the control of the
environmental regulator and output decisions are the controls of the ﬁrms which are assumed to
use either open-loop or markov strategies.
Benchekroun and Van Long (1998) analyze a Markovian tax policy whereby the output tax
rate faced by a ﬁrm at any given time depends solely on the current pollution stock. By con-
struction, such a linear markovian tax rule is credible, in the sense that it is time consistent and
subgame perfect. The authors provide a characterization of the optimal tax rule that is shown to
be increasing in the pollution stock and to ’decentralize’ the socially optimal time-path of pro-
duction. As for the dynamic properties of the tax, they obtain a surprising result. In an initial
time interval where the stock of pollution is low, the tax rate may be negative implying a subsidy.
Paradoxically, this subsidy induces ﬁrms to produce less than they would have if the industry had
not been regulated. Upon reﬂection, the explanation for this result is simple. Since the tax rate
at any given time depends solely on the pollution stock, ﬁrms anticipate that an increase in their
production will lead to reduced subsidies in the future and eventually precipitate the turn of the
subsidy into a tax. As noted by Benchekroun and Van Long (1998), this is an instance of ‘carrot
and stick‘ policy.
Motivated by a long standing concern for infrastructure competition, this paper elaborates on
Benchekroun and Van Long’s seminal contribution by studying how differences in initial stocks
of infrastructure alter the dynamic properties of the optimal and credible tax or subsidy policy.
We consider a stylized dynamic extension of the model of interjurisdictional spillovers intro-
duced by Wildasin (1991). The focus of our attention are two jurisdictions that are located in
the same watershed or airshed2. Each jurisdiction invest in public (or green) infrastructure3 in
order to provide a public good to its own residents. However, the public good produced by one
jurisdiction beneﬁts also the residents in the other jurisdiction who cannot be excluded from ‘its‘
consumption once it is provided. In the absence of any regulation initiative, the presence of posi-
tive interjurisdictional spillovers will result in the underprovision of public infrastructure. Indeed,
local jurisdictions will not take into account the positive spillovers that beneﬁt the non-residents
when setting their investment policies. A ﬁrst remedy is to elevate the decision making process to
a higher level of jurisdiction so that external beneﬁts of public infrastructure become internal to
the jurisdiction which funds them. A drawback of this solution is that it alienates local residents
from the control they have over issues that impact their local community and daily life. A second
remedy is for the higher level of jurisdiction to implement an infrastructure capital subsidization
policy that will help coordinate local investment decisions while preserving subsidiarity. This is
the route we travel by in this paper.
The logic of regulation in our model is similar to that of Benchekroun and Van Long (1998).
A benevolent authority sets the capital infrastructure subsidization scheme and local jurisdictions
decides upon their expenditures in public infrastructure taking the subsidization rule as given. A
key difference with Benchekroun and Van Long (1998) lies in the state of the system which is
not scalar. Instead it is a two-dimensional vector describing the stocks of infrastructure of each
jurisdiction at any given time.
Consistently with the purposes of our paper we expunge the model of any asymmetry across
jurisdictions except regarding their initial stock of infrastructure in order to highlight how this
particular asymmetry affects the dynamic properties of the subsidy4. This is a dynamic type
of heterogeneity that vanishes in the long-run. Consequently, at the steady state, usual intuitions
from static symmetric settings apply. Due to the presence of positive interjurisdictional spillovers,
2Here, we depart from the original meaning of the terms ‘watershed‘ and ‘airshed‘ and adopt the North-American usage
in which they have come to describe the geographical boundary for water and air quality standards.
3Throughout this article, we shall use the terms ‘public‘ and ‘green‘, interchangeably.
4We also assume away any informational obstacles to regulation. For a recent review on such issues, see for instance
Lewis (1996).
2both jurisdictions will inefﬁciently under-invest, which calls for the implementation of a green
capital subsidization scheme. In the short run, however, a counterintuitive property appears: It
is shown that the optimal scheme may require to simultaneously tax one jurisdiction and sub-
sidize the other for an initial period of time. And which jurisdiction should be initially taxed
depends on whether infrastructure stocks are substitute or complement. When they are substitute
(respectively complement), the jurisdiction with the lower (resp. larger) initial stock is ﬁrst taxed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. In
Section 3, the utilitarian social optimum is characterized. Then, in Section 4, we derive the opti-
mal infrastructure capital subsidization scheme and we discuss its dynamic properties in Section
5. Section 6 provides examples and discusses intuitions. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude.
2 A dynamic framework for infrastructure competi-
tion
We consider a dynamic extension of the model of interjurisdictional spillovers introduced by
Wildasin (1991). Two jurisdictions indexed by i = 1;2 are located in the same watershed or air-
shed. Each jurisdiction is inhabited by identical households who are assumed to be immobile and
inﬁnitely lived. These households can be treated as a representative consumer whose preferences
are deﬁned over a composite private commodity, denoted by xi, and an index of environmental
quality denoted by si. These preferences can be represented by the utility function
ui(xi;si) = xi+si; 8i = 1;2: (1)
Local stocks of infrastructure are the inputs in the production process of environmental qual-
ity. This relationship can be expressed by a quadratic production function si = Pi(Ki;Kj).
We assume that jurisdictions compete in public infrastructure over an inﬁnite time period.
Let ei(t) denote Jurisdiction i’s expenditure on its public infrastructure at time t 2[0;¥[ and Ki(t)
denote its stock of green infrastructure. Each jurisdiction is endowed with an initial stock of green
infrastructure equal to Ki(0) = K0
i . Investment is a ﬂow that allows jurisdictions to adjust their
stocks of public infrastructure. Jurisdiction i’s public expenditure ei(t) modiﬁes its current stock
of infrastructure according to the following law of motion
˙ Ki(t) = ei(t) dKi(t); 8i = 1;2; (2)
where d is the constant rate of depreciation. In this paper, we assume that investment is reversible
and resale of infrastructure capital is impossible. In other words, ei(t) is restricted to be non-
negative and d is strictly positive.
Investment in infrastructure capital is costly. Let Ci(ei) denotes jurisdiction i’s cost of infras-
tructure capital adjustment. We assume thatCi(0)=0 andC0
i(ei)>0,C00
i (ei)>0. In other words,
jurisdiction i’s cost of altering its infrastructure stock is an increasing and convex function of the
rate of investment. In our model, where investment is reversible (d > 0), this assumption implies
that instantaneous adjustments of capital stocks are ruled out.
We assume that each jurisdiction is endowed with an exogenous revenue yi which can be
used to ﬁnance public expenditures and consumption good expenses. Accordingly, jurisdiction
i’s budget constraint is
xi+Ci(ei) = yi: (3)
Plugging the budget constraint (3) into the utility function (1) yields the reduced-form utility for
each jurisdiction:
Wi(Ki;Kj;ei) = yi+Pi(Ki;Kj) Ci(ei): (4)
Each local jurisdiction is assumed to choose the time-path of public expenditure in infrastructure
capital that maximizes the integral of its discounted stream of net social beneﬁts. Denoting by












e rtdt; 8i = 1;2; (5)
with respect to the state equations (2) and the non-negativity constraint ei(t)  0. To complete
the description of each jurisdiction’s problem, the information structure must be speciﬁed. In this
paper, it is assumed that each jurisdiction is able to observe the state of the game at any given
time and make investment decisions based on this information. Namely, we assume that both
jurisdictions use markov strategies; i.e., decision rules of the form ei(t) = fi(Ki(t);Kj(t)).
The above elements deﬁne a game of competition in infrastructure which belongs to the ex-
tensively studied class of capital accumulation games5. In analyzing the outcome of interjurisdic-
tional competition, the relevant solution concept is then the markov perfect Nash equilibrium : a
pair of markov perfect strategies that are mutual best-responses. In our model where green infras-
tructures generate positive spillovers across the boundaries of jurisdictions, the Nash equilibrium
outcome predicts that both jurisdictions will underinvest. This underinvestment conclusion has
been a major argument in favour of transferring decision making about public infrastructure to a
higher level of jurisdiction that encompasses all the spillovers.
In this paper, we consider a different remedy. We assume that the higher level jurisdiction
wishes to coordinate local jurisdictions investment decisions and ’decentralize’ the social opti-
mum by means of a capital investment subsidization scheme. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the
social regulator implements a linear markovian subsidization policy to support local expenditures
in green capital. Under this tax scheme, each jurisdiction i is granted an amount ti(Ki;Kj) per
unit of investment in public infrastructure capital ei. It is important to note here that the unit rate
of subsidization depends exclusively on the two jurisdictions stocks of infrastructure at any given
time t.
In the remainder of this paper, we restrict our attention to the qualitative implications of ini-
tial differences in public infrastructure for the dynamic properties of the optimal subsidy policy.
With this purpose in mind, we assume that the two jurisdictions are identical in all respects, ex-
cept (perhaps) their initial stocks of public infrastructure. In other words, we assume identical
cost functions, C1(e) = C2(e) = C(e); 8e 2 Â+ and symmetric environmental quality indexes
P2(K2;K1) = P1(K2;K1); 8(K1;K2) 2 Â2
+. However, we allow for different initial stocks of in-




we make speciﬁc assumptions about functional forms. Environmental quality indexes are as-
sumed to be quadratic and given by








j; 8i = 1;2;
with p1; p2 > 0;p3 < 0 and p5 < 0. Furthermore we assume that p1 and p2 are sufﬁciently large
to ensure that ¶Pi
¶Ki > 0 and ¶Pi
¶Kj > 0; i.e., the quality of the environment in jurisdiction i is in-
creasing in its own stock of infrastructure and interjurisdictional externalities are positive. These
assumptions imply that environmental quality is produced through a technology that features de-
creasing returns to scale. Parameter p4 6=0 is not restricted in sign and will play an important part
in our investigations. We introduce the following terminology due to Figuières (2004). Capital
stocks are said to be complements when an increase in the stock of capital accumulated by one ju-
risdiction enhances the marginal productivity of its rival’s own stock of capital. Conversely, when
an increase in the capital stock of one jurisdiction lowers the marginal productivity of its rival’s
own stock of capital, they are said to be substitutes. Correspondingly, stocks are complements if
p4 is positive, whereas they are substitutes if p4 is negative.
5See Dockner et al. (2000, chapt. 9) for an introduction. Also, see Driskill and McCafferty (1989); Fershtman and
Muller (1984, 1986); Figuières (2002, 2004); Figuières, Gardères and Rychen (2002); Reynolds (1991).





where c1 0;c2 >0 are cost parameters. The marginal cost of investment is thus increasing in ei:
Observe that this speciﬁcation of the two jurisdictions cost functions as a strictly convex function
of their investments has important consequences for the analysis: it induces ﬁrms to adjust their
stocks of infrastructure gradually.
3 The utilitarian social optimum
Let us assume that the responsibility for infrastructure ﬁnancing has been transferred to a higher
level of government that encompasses both local jurisdictions; e.g., an intercommunal or inter-
regional association. As a consequence of this delegation, interjurisdictional spillovers are now
internalized into the decision making of a single economic agent. Then, the problem faced by the




subject to (2) and ei(t)  0;8t 2]0;¥[. This amounts to solving a two-state variable optimal
control problem. We will refer to the solution to this problem as the utilitarian social optimum
and use it as a benchmark for the remainder of the analysis.
In this section we show that there exists a unique optimal path of investment in public infras-
tructure. To solve for the social optimum we make use of Pontryagin’s maximum principle. The
current value Hamiltonian of the centralized problem (7) is deﬁned as6












where l1 and l2 are the co-state variables associated with ˙ K1 and ˙ K2, respectively. Assuming
interior solutions, Pontryagin’s maximum principle implies the following necessary conditions
for optimality (¶H=¶ei = 0; ˙ li = rli ¶H=¶Ki):
li = c1+c2ei; 8i = 1;2; (9)
˙ li = (r+d)li (p1+ p2) (p3+ p5)K1 2p4K2; 8i(i 6= j) = 1;2; (10)






2(t))]e rt = 0; (11)
where Kc
i (:) denotes a candidate for optimization and Ki(:) is any other path. Using Equation (9)
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0 (r+d)  2p4  (p3+p5)
1=c2 0  d 0





























along with the initial conditions (K1(0) = K0
1; K2(0) = K0
2) and the transversality condition (11).
The above system of differential equations (12) can be rewritten more compactly as ˙ x = Ax   b.
6We have not incorporated explicitly the constraints ei(t);ej(t)  0 at the formulation stage of the problem. We preferred
to solve it and check afterward that those constraints are veriﬁed. The same remark applies to the study of decentralized
behaviors in the next section.
5A steady-state solution (K¥
1 ; K¥
2 ) is deﬁned as a constant trajectory that solves (12); i.e., ˙ x = 0.





2 ) to yield:
e¥
1 = e¥
2 = d K¥; (13)
K¥
1 = K¥
2 = K¥ =
(r + d)c1   (p1 + p2)
(p3 + p5) + 2 p4   d (r + d)c2
: (14)
The stability properties of the steady-state can be determined by examining the eigenvalues of the
coefﬁcient matrix A. Solving the characteristic equation
det(rI   A) =





where I is the identity matrix, yields four real and distinct eigenvalues, two of which are positive
and two of which are negative, conﬁrming a saddle-point solution. The following proposition
provides a characterization of the social optimum.






















2   2K¥)er2t + d K¥; (17)













































2   2K¥)er2t + K¥; (21)
which converge to the unique steady state K¥.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Finally, note that the two jurisdictions’ optimal rates of investment at any timet can be written
as functions of the state vector (K1(t); K2(t)). The so-called feedback representations of the




[2d + r1 + r2]K1 +
1
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[2d + r1 + r2]K2 +
1
2
(r2   r1)K1   r2K¥: (23)
Having characterized the utilitarian optimal solution, we now turn to the analysis of the de-
centralized scenario.
64 A pigovian remedy to infrastructure competition
Now we assume that the higher level jurisdiction seeks to implement the social optimum through
the choice of a capital investment subsidy scheme. With the aim of coordinating local expen-
ditures, the social regulator announces a linear-markovian subsidy scheme T = ft
1(K1;K2),
t
2(K1;K2)g before jurisdictions take their decisions7. Under this scheme, each jurisdiction i is
granted a subsidy ti(Ki(t);Kj(t)) per unit of expenditure in public infrastructure at time t, where
the unit subsidy rate depends only on the two jurisdictions current period stocks of green infras-
tructure capital, Ki(t) and Kj(t). In the remainder of this paper, it is assumed that ti(Ki; Kj) is
not restricted in sign. Indeed, it may be negative implying a tax. It is shown that this pigouvian
scheme T decentralizes the social utilitarian optimum as a markov perfect Nash equilibrium. In
other words, the equilibrium that the economy will reach when each jurisdiction i determines its
preferred investment rule – taking as given both jurisdiction j ’s investment rule ej(Kj;Ki) and
the subsidy rule t
i (Ki;Kj) – coincide with the social optimum.
To begin with, let us consider how a linear-markovian subsidy affects local jurisdictions’
incentives to invest in green infrastructure. In the presence of subsidization, at a markov perfect







Pi(Ki; Kj)  C(ei) + ti(Ki; Kj)ei

dt (24)
s:t: ˙ Ki = ei   d Ki; Ki(0) = K0
i ; (25)
˙ Kj = ej(Kj; Ki)   dKj; Kj(0) = K0
j: (26)
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is deﬁned as
Hi = Pi(Ki;Kj)  C(ei) + ti(Ki;Kj)ei + mi(ei   dKi) + si(ej(Kj;Ki)   dKj); (27)
where mi and si are the costate variables associated with ˙ Ki and ˙ Kj, respectively. Let us recall that
the optimal strategies of jurisdiction i’s opponent are necessarily of form ej(Kj;Ki)=f1+f2Kj+
f3Ki, given the linear-quadratic structure of the game. Assuming interior solutions, Pontryagin’s
maximum principle then implies that the following conditions
mi = c1 + c2 ei   m   nKi   qKj; (28)
˙ mi = (r + d)mi   (p1 + p3 Ki + p4 Kj)   nei   sif3; (29)
˙ si = (r + d   f2)si   (p2 + p4 Ki + p5 Kj)   qei: (30)
hold along jurisdiction i’s optimal trajectory of investment (where the transversality condition has
been omitted for sake of brevity).
The optimality conditions provide the higher level jurisdiction with the information needed
to foresee how a subsidy policy will alter local jurisdictions’ incentives to invest in public in-
frastructure. On the basis of this information, the regulator will select the infrastructure capital
subsidization scheme T so as to decentralize the social optimum. Formally, this amounts to
choosing T in such a way that the optimality conditions (28)-(30) match the conditions for a
social optimum (9) and (10). The following proposition characterizes the optimal tax rule:
Proposition 2 The optimal subsidization scheme that decentralizes the socially optimal time-
path of expenditure in public infrastructure capital as a markov perfect Nash Equilibrium is
t
i (Ki;Kj) = m + nKi + qKj; 8i(i 6= j) = 1;2; (31)
7Benchekroun and Van Long (1998) more precisely state that the scheme is announced at date t = 0 before economic
agents take their decision. In a linear quadratic inﬁnite horizon model, such a scheme is subgame perfect. Thus an alternative
timing, more in line with the dynamic spirit of our analysis, is for the regulator to revise and announce the tax or subsidy rate
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Proof. See Appendix B.
5 Complementarity, substitutability and the role of ini-
tial conditions
In the next section, we rely on selected numerical examples and illustrations to provide important
insights about the qualitative properties of the optimal markovian scheme. Most notably, on the
basis of these examples it will be shown that for an initial period of time the optimal pigovian
rule may require to simultaneously tax one jurisdiction and subsidize the other. This property is
to be linked to the gap between initial endowments of public infrastructure and the nature of the
technical relationship between the two stocks. The following qualitative results add important
information about how the technical relationship among the stocks alters the strategic features of
the game. Moreover, it will provide additional guidance in the choice of our numerical examples.
First of all, let us state a result which shows the connection between the technical relationship
among stocks and best reply functions under optimal regulation.
Proposition 3 Let the stocks be complement, p4 > 0 (resp. substitute, p4 < 0). Then:
 the pigovian scheme is an increasing (resp. decreasing) function of the rival stock, i.e.
q > 0 (resp. q < 0).
 at the optimally regulated markov perfect equilibrium, jurisdiction i’s decision rule is an
increasing (resp. a decreasing) function of the rival stock.
Proof. Appendix C1.
Assumption 1 p4 > 0 and
 2p4+p3+p5
(r+d r1)c2 = d + r1 ' 0.
Assumption 1 captures a family of investments problems where capital stocks are comple-
ments (p4 > 0) and costs are relatively large (c2  0).
Lemma 1 Let Assumption 1 hold. Then K
i (t) > K
j(t) () t
i (t) < t
j (t) :
Proof. Appendix C2.
Therefore one can deduce:
8Proposition 4 Let Assumption 1 hold. Assume also that jurisdiction j is initially taxed whereas
jurisdiction i is subsidized, t
j (0) < 0 and t
i (0) > 0. Then K
j(0) > K
i (0):
This proposition means in particular that, under complementarity and large variable costs,
when there is an initial taxation, then it applies to the jurisdiction with the largest initial capital
stock.
Assumption 2 p4 < 0 and p4 < p5 and p4 < (p3 + p5)=2.
Assumption 2 captures a family of investments problems where capital stocks are substitutes
(p4 < 0) and the degree of substitutability is strong enough (p4 < p5).
Lemma 2 Let Assumption 2 hold. Then K
i (t) > K
j(t) () t
i (t) > t
j (t) :
Proof. Appendix C3.
Thus, the following reversed property can now be established:
Proposition 5 Let Assumption 2 hold. Assume also that jurisdiction j is initially taxed whereas
jurisdiction i is subsidized, t
j (0) < 0 and t
i (0) > 0. Then K
j(0) < K
i (0):
This proposition indicates that, under "strong" substitutability, when there is an initial taxa-
tion, then it applies to the jurisdiction with the lowest initial capital stock.
The next section uses numerical examples to illustrate those results and to discuss the correspond-
ing intuitions.
6 Illustrations
First of all, it is useful to highlight in what respects static and dynamic Pigovian instruments dif-
fer. In a static setting the subsidization rate faced by jurisdiction i is constant so that an increase in
its level of investment translates directly into an increase of the subsidy it receives. In addition to
this quantity effect, in a dynamic setting, jurisdictions have to take into account the intertemporal
‘price‘ effects of their decisions. First, since the rate of subsidization of each jurisdiction depends
on both stocks of infrastructure, a change in the rate of investment of any jurisdiction directly
alters the subsidy rate enjoyed by both jurisdictions. Second, at a MPE jurisdiction i correctly




and so the indirect effect a stock increase will
have on Kj and t
i (Ki;Kj). Namely, jurisdiction i anticipates that jurisdiction j will reply to a
change in Ki by adjusting its capital stock Kj and that this strategic move will affect t
i (Ki;Kj).
Second, social efﬁciency requires that i) the gap between the two stocks remains optimal all along
the transition phase and ii) eventually closes when the socially optimal steady-state is reached. It
should be noted that while K¥ (see expression 14) is independent of the initial conditions, the op-
timal evolution of the gap depends on the technological relationship that links capital stocks. In-
deed, cost efﬁciency requires that the substitutability (or complementarity) property of the stocks
be used to minimize the cost of the transition to the steady-state. Hence, it should come as no
surprise that both the optimal evolution of the stocks (equations 16 and 17) and the optimal evo-
lution of the corrective instrument designed to decentralize the social optimum (propositions 4
and 5 ) depend on the initial conditions.
The challenge is to come to grips with these uncommon features. With this purpose in mind,
we now go through four numerical examples in which stocks are assumed to be complements and
all parameters except initial capital stocks remain unchanged. A ﬁfth example will be used to
illustrate a situation in which stocks are substitute.
96.1 An example with technical complementarity
For the selected numerical parameters, the optimal tax/subsidy policy (2) is given by:
t
i (Ki;Kj) = 158:564   1:89455 Ki + 1:8511 Kj: (35)
Note that t
i (Ki;Kj) is decreasing in its ﬁrst argument and increasing in its second (see Propo-
sition 3). Furthermore, observe that the optimal policy rule may not offer a subsidy to both
jurisdictions. For example, if jurisdiction i is initially endowed with a large stock of green infras-
tructure and competes with a rival which lacks infrastructure, then t
i (Ki;Kj) may be negative for
an initial period of time – implying that jurisdiction i is temporarily taxed. The optimal corrective





= 26:1367   0:262795 Ki + 0:255191 Kj (36)
which coincide with the socially optimal time-path of investment in green infrastructure. Note
that this strategy is increasing in the rival stock. A property that could have been anticipated from
Proposition 4 since the selected parameter values satisfy Assumption 1.
6.1.1 Identical initial endowments
To begin with, assume that both jurisdictions are initially endowed with identical stocks of green
infrastructure. Naturally, this case implies that both jurisdictions are identical and will follow the
same time-path of investment in public infrastructure, K1(t) = K2(t) = K(t); 8t. Consequently,
the optimal tax/subsidy policy rewrites as:
t
i (K) = m + (n + q)K
Socially optimal time-paths of investment in green infrastruture, capital accumulation and subsi-
dization are depicted in Figure 1. Note that n + q < 0 so that t
i (K) is a decreasing function of
K. In other words, the optimal rate of subsidization monotonically decreases over time towards
its steady-state level ˆ t¥: This pattern of evolution should come as no surprise. Indeed, comparing
the Feedback-Nash investment trajectory with the optimal one (see Figure 1a), it appears clearly
that the need to reinforce incentives to invest is greater at earlier dates.
Figure 1 about here
6.1.2 Difference in initial endowments
Now we assume that jurisdiction 1 is initially endowed with a larger stock of green infrastructure
than jurisdiction 2. This implies that the two jurisdictions will follow separate trajectories of
investment (and thus capital accumulation). However, such an asymmetry will disappear in the
long-run since both trajectories converge to the same steady-state. The graphical comparison of
unregulated and regulated investment levels reveals that jurisdiction 2 should initially commit to
larger investments than jurisdiction 1, although this demand is smoothly lifted over time.
Figure 2 allows us to visualize how the required incentives are provided by the optimal markovian
scheme. Initially, jurisdiction 2 receives a higher subsidy for investing in green infrastructure than
jurisdiction 1. However as jurisdiction 2’s stock of infrastructure capital catches up with that of
its rival this preferential treatment is smoothly removed by simultaneously reducing t
2(K) and
increasing t
1(K) and eventually vanishes. Graphically, one sees that granted subsidies converge
to the same steady-state value. However, t




Figure 2 about here (former Figure 3)
8Details on the computation of the unregulated markov-perfect Nash-equilibrium of the game among jurisdictions are
omitted here as they can be found in Figuières (2002).
106.1.3 Carrot and stick policy with complementarity
In this example the gap between initial stocks of infrastructure has been increased further com-
pared to the previous case. Figures 3 and 4 allows for a comparison between unregulated and
socially optimal outcomes. The comparison reveals that the optimal tax/subsidy policy should
alter jurisdictions’ investment incentives in such a way that:
 jurisdiction 2 is lead to increase its investment at all dates, although to a lesser extent as
time passes by,
 jurisdiction 1 is driven to reduce its level of investment for an initial time period before
resuming its investment effort and eventually investing more than it would do in the laissez-
faire scenario for the remainder of the planning horizon (Figures 3(a) and 3(b)),
 the gap between green capital stocks is ﬁrst reduced so that the complementarity of the
stocks is better exploited before allowing both capital stocks to increase well above their
level in the unregulated scenario (Figures 4(a) and 4(b)).
The optimal Pigovian scheme (35) meets the above requirements. To see this, let us ﬁrst
consider the incentives it provides to the second jurisdiction. Observe that an increase in e2
augments K2 which in turn changes the subsidy rate through two channels. First, since t
2(K2;K1)
is a decreasing function of K2, an increase in K2 leads to a decrease in t
2(K2;K1). Second, due to
feedbackcomplementarity(see36)anincreaseinK2 alsoprovidesjurisdiction1withanincentive
to increase its investment in order to augment K1 – But since t
2(K2;K1) is an increasing function
of K1, this strategic move leads to an increase in the subsidy rate. In the chosen example, the
second positive effect dominates the ﬁrst negative effect implying that jurisdiction 2 is incited to
invest more.
Incentives faced by jurisdiction 1 are much more elaborated. Observe that an increase in
its investment also has two opposite effects. Yet, which one prevails depends on the relative
importance of the stocks, i.e. on the current state of the system. At a neighborhood of the initial
conditions, with a large K10 and a small K20, the negative effect prevails and gives jurisdiction 1
the incentive to reduce its investment. Note that t
1(K10;K20) is negative: this is a situation with
complementarity (p4 > 0) which illustrates Proposition 4.
This leads to the required initial reduction in the gap between the two stocks. As the rival stock
K2 increases, the positive effect soon dominates and t
1(K1;K2) turns into a subsidy which gives
jurisdiction 1 the incentive to invest more.
Figure 3 about here (former Figure 5)
Figure 4 about here (differences with complementarity)
6.2 An example where stocks are substitute
Finally, ﬁgures 5 and 6 illustrate a situation in which stocks are substitute (p4 < 0). For the
chosen numerical values, the optimal pigovian scheme is:
t
i (Ki;Kj) = 104:926   1:3549 Ki   1:7409 Kj: (37)
Observe that t
i (Ki;Kj) is now decreasing in both arguments. Furthermore, as in the previous
cases, jurisdictions are not always subsidized. For sufﬁciently large stocks of green infrastructure
11(and especially a large rival stock) the optimal corrective instrument is negative, implying a tax
on investment.





= 20:5688   0:181696 Ki   0:342131 Kj ; (38)
and are decreasing functions of the rival stock. A property that could have been anticipated from
Proposition 5 since the chosen parameter values satisfy Assumption 2.
The graphical comparison of regulated and unregulated time-paths of investment reveals that:
 Jurisdiction 1 underinvests for the whole planning horizon whereas jurisdiction 2 should
initially reduce its investment effort (roughly, until t = 24) and resume its investment effort
afterward (See ﬁgures 5(a) and 6(b)).
 the gap between the stocks should initially be increased (Figure 6(a)) to fully exploit their
substitutability which implies an increase of K1 and a reduction followed by an increase of
K2.
Let us now turn to the incentive properties of the optimal corrective instrument. Furthermore,
let us focus our attention on the complex mix of incentives it should provide to jurisdiction 2.
At the beginning of the planning period, t
2(K2;K1) is negative which implies that jurisdiction
2 faces a tax. This stems from the fact that jurisdiction 2 should initially reduce its investment.
Ceteris paribus, such a reduction would lead to a reduction of K2 which in turns would bring
about a decrease of t
2(K2;K1). Also the reduction of K2 increases e1 and K1 (because of strategic
feedback substitutability) and decrease t
2(K2;K1): At the initial state of the system, the second
effect dominates; the scheme is a tax that reduces when e2 reduces. Yet, if this jurisdiction is
taxed at early dates, it becomes subsidized long before t = 24. Still, despite this subsidization
Jurisdiction 2 is correctly induced to lower its investments until t ' 24, because at the prevailing
states of the system the subsidy is a decreasing function of e2. As in Benchekroun and Van Long
(1998) the sign of the instrument - negative for a tax, positive for a subsidy- in a dynamic context
is relatively unrelated to the immediate goals of reducing or increasing the incentives. Instead,
what matters is whether the scheme is a decreasing or an increasing function of the efforts.
And the gap is correctly increased with the large initial stock jurisdiction being encouraged to
investmorewhilethelowinitialstockjurisdictionbeingfurtherinducedtodecreaseitsinvestment
before being encouraged to invest.
Figure 5 about here
Figure 6 about here (differences with substitutability)
7 Conclusion
This paper complements earlier contributions on price-based policies in a dynamic setting by in-
vestigating how differences in initial conditions alter the dynamic properties of the optimal tax
or subsidy policy. Speciﬁcally, we concentrate on a model of competition in public infrastructure
between two jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction invests over time in green infrastructure to provide
environmental services to its own residents. However, once supplied, it is supposedly impossible
to exclude the residents of the other jurisdiction from the consumption of these environmental
services. We assume that the two jurisdictions are identical in all respects except (perhaps) their
initial stocks of green infrastructure capital. As is well known, this is a dynamic type of het-
erogeneity that disappears in the long run. Consequently, at the steady state, usual intuitions
from static settings apply. Due to the presence of positive interjurisdictional spillovers, both ju-
risdictions will inefﬁciently under-invest, which calls for the implementation of a green capital
subsidization scheme. In the short run, however, counterintuitive properties are established:
12i) the pigovian scheme is not necessarily a subsidy. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that the sign of the
instrument, negative for a tax, positive for a subsidy, in a dynamic context is relatively
unrelated to the immediate goals of reducing or increasing the incentives. Intuitions gained
from static settings cannot be transposed into dynamic frameworks without care; important
qualiﬁcations are often required. For instance in situations where the goal is to encourage
investments, to some extent it does not matter whether the incentive instrument is a tax
rather than a subsidy, provided that the tax is a decreasing function of the investment.
ii) One jurisdiction can be temporarily taxed, even though at those taxation dates its investments
should be increased, whereas the other is subsidized. It is shown how these phenomena
are related to initial conditions and to the kind of technological link between stocks of
infrastructure (complementarity or substitutability). Put differently, initial conditions can
be important drivers for the qualiﬁcations alluded to above.
A follow-up research of the present analysis would be to investigate the pigouvian regula-
tion of infrastructure competition when public capitals generate negative externalities. One may
expect in this context that, despite the needs to discourage non cooperative investments, one ju-
risdiction might be subsidized at early dates.
13Appendices
A Optimal time-paths of investment
In this appendix we characterize the socially optimal time-paths of investment in public infras-
tructure. From the theory of differential equations, solutions to the system of differential equa-
tions (12) are of the form
K1 = a1er1t + b1er2t + K¥; (39)
K2 = a2er1t + b2er2t + K¥: (40)
where the parameters a1;a2;b1;b2 are constant coefﬁcients to be determined. Differentiating
(39) and (40) with respect to time yields
˙ K1 = a1r1er1t + b1r2er2t; (41)
˙ K2 = a2r1er1t + b2r2er2t: (42)
Also, we know that when optimal time-paths of public expenditure exist, they can be written in
feedback form as
ei(t) = f1 + f2Ki(t) + f3Kj(t); 8i(i 6= j) = 1;2: (43)
Substituting these strategies into the Nerlove-Arrow equations yields an alternative (feedback)
representation of optimal capital stock trajectories:
˙ K1 = (f2   d)K1 + f3K2 + f1; (44)
˙ K2 = f3K1 + (f2   d)K2 + f1: (45)
This system can be rewritten in matrix form as ˙ K = BK +h. The coefﬁcient matrix B admits two
distinct real roots:
r1 = f2   d   f3; (46)
r2 = f2   d + f3: (47)
Wearenowinapositiontodeterminethevaluesofthecoefﬁcientsfa1;a2;b1;b2gbyidentifying
equations (39) and (40) with (44) and (45). From (44) we know that f3K2 = ˙ K1 (f2 d)K1 f1.
Plugging (39) and (41) into this expression, and rearranging terms yields:
f3K2 = a1(r1   (f2   d))er1t + b1(r2   (f2   d))er2t   (f2   d)K¥   f1: (48)
Now, from (46) and (47) we know that (r1 (f2 d))= f3 and (r2 (f2 d))=f3. Plugging
this into (48) and rearranging terms yields
K2 =  a1er1t + b1er2t   f 1
3 ((f2   d)K¥ + f1); (49)
Byidentiﬁcationof(39)and(49), itcomesthata1 = a2 =a, b2 =b1 =b andK¥ = f1=(f3+
f2   d). From (46) and (47), it comes that f2 = (r1 + r2 + 2d)=2 and f3 = (r2   r1)=2.
Plugging this in K¥ yields f1 =  r2K¥. Now,let us denote DKi(t) = Ki(t)   K¥. Observe that
K1(0) = a1 + b1 + K¥ and K2(0) = a2 + b2 + K¥ so that we have a system of equation
a + b = DK1(0); (50)
b   a = DK2(0); (51)


















2   2K¥): (53)
Substituting a for a1,  a for a2 and b for b1 and b2 into (39) and (40) yields Equations (20)
and (21). Finally, Equations (16) and (17) easily follow from Equation (2) by observing that
ei = ˙ Ki + dKi yields
e1 = a(d + r1)er1t + b(d + r2)er2t + dK¥; (54)
e2 =  a(d + r1)er1t + b(d + r2)er2t + dK¥: (55)
B Optimal tax/subsidy policy
Let us recall that jurisdiction i’s optimal time-path of investment in public infrastructure is given
by (54). Plugging ec
1 into the short-run equilibrium condition (28) and rearranging terms yields
mi = v1 + v2aer1t + v3ber2t; (56)
where v1 =  m + c1 + (dc2   n   q)K ¥, v2 =  n + q + c2 (d + r1) and v3 =  (n + q) +
c2 (d + r2). Differentiating (56) with respect to time, we get
˙ mi = v2 a r1 er1t + v3 b r2 er2t: (57)
Using Equation (57) to eliminate ˙ mi from Equation (29), solving for si and rearranging terms
yields













((p3 + p4)   v3 (r + d   r2) + n (d + r2)): (61)
Finally, using Equation (58) to eliminate si from (30) yields
˙ si = z1 + z2aer1t + z3ber2t (62)
with
z1 = p2 + K¥ (qd + p4 + p5)   w1 (r + d   f2); (63)
z2 = (p4   p5) + q (d + r1) + w2 ( r   d + r1 + f2); (64)
z3 = (p4 + p5) + q (d + r2) + w3 ( r   d + r2 + f2): (65)


















((n+q)r+(2n+q)d +p3+p4 qr2 c2(r+d  r2)(d +r2)) (70)
+[(p4+p5)+q(d +r2)]; (71)
where
X = (r + d   r1   f2); (72)
Y = (r + d   r2   f2): (73)
Finally, we solve the algebraic system fz1 = 0; z2 = 0; z3 = 0g for the parameters fm; n; qg.
After tedious but straightforward manipulations, one obtains expressions (32)-(34).
C Qualitative properties
C.1 Analysis of ¶ti=¶Kj and of Regulated best response functions
In order to establish the link between the sign of p4 and that of ¶ti=¶Kj, recall that
q =
(4 p5   c2 (2r   r1   3r2) (2r   3r1   r2)) (r1   r2) + 8 p4 ( r + r1 + r2)
4 (r   r1   r2) (2 (r + d)   r1   r2)
:
Note that the denominator is positive since both r1 and r2 are negative. Hence, the sign of q is
the same as the sign of its numerator:
Num(q) = (4p5 c2(2r r1 3r2)(2r 3r1 r2))(r1 r2)+8p4( r+r1+r2) (74)
From the characteristic equation (15) and along with the fact that only its negative roots (18) and
(19) are admissible, we have:
2p4 =  (p3 + p5) + (r + d   r1)(d + r1)c2; (75)
and
  2p4 =  (p3 + p5) + (r + d   r2)(d + r2)c2: (76)
Plugging (75) and (76) into equation (74) yields two alternative expressions for Num(q). Adding
these two expressions and rearranging terms, we obtain
Num(q) =  (r1   r2)(c2r2
1 + 6c2r1r2   4c2rr1 + c2r2
2 + 2c2r2   4p5   4c2rr2) (77)
Because r1 and r2 are negative the term between the second bracket is positive. Thus the sign
of Num(q) depends only on the sign of r1   r2: To complete the proof, from the expressions
(18) and (19) observe that:
 p4 > 0 implies (r1   r2) < 0 and then from (77) q > 0,
 p4 < 0 implies (r1   r2) > 0 and then from (77) q < 0.
Finally, from the last two equivalences along with expressions (22) and (23), one can easily





16C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Observe that:
t
i (t)   t
j (t) = m + nK
i (t) + qK
j(t)   (m + nK
j(t) + qK
i (t))
= (n   q)
 
K




From (32) and (33), one obtains
n   q =
2(p4   p5)(r   2r1)
( 2r + 3r1 + r2)(r + 2d)
+ q 2(r   2r1)(d + r1)
( 2r + 3r1 + r2)(r + 2d)
:
From the above expression it is straightforward to see that
sign(n   q) =  sign[(p4   p5) + q (d + r1)] :
Now observe that sign(n   q) < 0 if d +r1 = 0. Using a continuity argument for cases where
d +r1 is different from zero but small (Assumption A1) one also has sign(n   q) < 0. Hence,
under Assumption 1 one has
K
i (t) > K
j(t) () t
i (t) < t
j (t) :
C.3 Proof of Lemma 2
From the proof of Lemma 1, recall that
sign(n   q) =  sign[(p4   p5) + q (d + r1)]:
Note that under Assumption 2 we have q < 0, (d + r1) > 0 and (p4   p5) < 0. Hence we have
sign(n   q) > 0 so that
K
i (t) > K
j(t) () t
i (t) > t
j (t) :
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18Figures
(a) Time-paths of investment (b) Time-paths of capital accumulation
(c) Time-paths of subsidization
Figure 1: Socially optimal trajectories when jurisdictions are initially endowed with identical stocks of
green infrastructure (parameter values: p0 = 0; p1 = 50; p2 = 50; p3 =  1:525; p4 = 1:5; p5 =  1:525; r =
1=10; c1 = 0; c2 = 10; d = 0:275; K10 = K20 = 0)
19(a) Time-paths of investment (b) Time-paths of capital accumulation
(c) DKi(t) = Ki(t)   ˆ Ki(t)
Figure 2: Socially optimal trajectories when jurisdictions 1 initially is endowed with slightly more capital
stock (1) (parameter values: p0 =0; p1 =50; p2 =50; p3 = 1:525; p4 =1:5; p5 = 1:525; r =1=10; c1 =
0; c2 = 10; d = 0:275; K10 = 40;K20 = 0)
20(a) Time-paths of investment (b) Time-paths of capital accumulation
(c) Time-paths of subsidization
Figure 3: Carrot and stick policy with complementarity (parameter values: p0 = 0; p1 = 50; p2 = 50; p3 =
 1:525; p4 = 1:5; p5 =  1:525; r = 1=10; c1 = 0; c2 = 10; d = 0:275; K10 = 90 = K¥
1 ;K20 = 0)
(a) Time-paths of capital accumulation (b) DKi(t) = Ki(t)   ˆ Ki(t)
Figure 4: Differences in capital stocks with complementarity (parameter values: see Figure 3)
21(a) Time-paths of investment (b) Time-paths of capital accumulation
(c) Time-paths of subsidization
Figure 5: Carrot and stick policy with substitutability (parameter values: p0 = 0; p1 = 75; p2 = 65; p3 =
 1; p4 =  1:25; p5 =  1; r = 1=10; c1 = 1; c2 = 8; d = 0:225; K10 = 48;K20 = 22)
(a) Time-paths of capital accumulation (b) DKi(t) = Ki(t)   ˆ Ki(t)
Figure 6: Differences in capital stocks with substitutability (parameter values: see Figure 5)
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